風(fēng)險一：激勵對象的道德風(fēng)險
Risk 1: Moral hazard of incentive targets
股權(quán)激勵的初衷是解決企業(yè)所有者與管理者之間的利益平衡問題。管理者為公司披肝瀝膽，厥功甚偉，理應(yīng)獲得對應(yīng)的獎勵。當(dāng)管理者獲得股權(quán)后，也成了企業(yè)所有者的一員，跟公司的長遠(yuǎn)利益更加一致，更加關(guān)心公司的未來前途。
The original intention of equity incentives is to solve the problem of balancing the interests of enterprise owners and managers. Managers have made great contributions to the company and deserve corresponding rewards. When managers acquire equity, they become part of the owner of the enterprise, more aligned with the long-term interests of the company, and more concerned about the future prospects of the company.
要實現(xiàn)這個目標(biāo)的前提是，激勵對象擁有較高的道德水平。通常而言，管理層既是股權(quán)激勵計劃的執(zhí)行者，也是受益者。假如沒有權(quán)責(zé)明確的規(guī)章制度約束，激勵對象有可能為了一己私利而擅自從事高風(fēng)險投資活動，甚至操控財務(wù)指標(biāo)和股價。
The prerequisite for achieving this goal is that the target audience has a high moral level. Generally speaking, management is both the executor and beneficiary of equity incentive plans. If there are no clear rules and regulations on rights and responsibilities, incentive targets may engage in high-risk investment activities for personal gain, and even manipulate financial indicators and stock prices.
為此，公司在制定股權(quán)激勵計劃時應(yīng)該引入獨立董事，董事會下設(shè)的股權(quán)激勵專門委員會要加強對股權(quán)激勵的監(jiān)管。
Therefore, when formulating equity incentive plans, companies should introduce independent directors, and the equity incentive committee under the board of directors should strengthen the supervision of equity incentives.
風(fēng)險二：激勵對象坐吃山空
Risk 2: The incentive target is sitting on the sidelines
部分創(chuàng)業(yè)公司本想為老員工提供更好的保障，讓他們對公司更加忠誠，但在施行豐厚的股權(quán)激勵時沒有建立配套的約束機制。于是，一些激勵對象安于現(xiàn)狀，只是坐享分紅，而不再積極進取。如此一來，股權(quán)激勵從激勵手段淪為“懶人”的保護傘，完全違背了公司的初衷。隨著“懶人”的增加，公司上下都會變得毫無干勁，從而導(dǎo)致業(yè)績滑坡。
Some startup companies originally intended to provide better protection for their old employees and make them more loyal to the company, but did not establish a supporting constraint mechanism when implementing generous equity incentives. So, some incentive targets are content with the status quo, just sitting on the dividends, and no longer actively striving. In this way, equity incentives have become a protective umbrella for "lazy people" from incentive methods, completely violating the company's original intention. With the increase of "lazy people", the entire company will become unresponsive, leading to a decline in performance.
風(fēng)險三：淪為套現(xiàn)工具
Risk Three: Becoming a Cash Out Tool
股權(quán)激勵的效果受到行權(quán)條件的直接影響。如果行權(quán)條件要求過高，激勵對象費了九牛二虎之力才勉強達(dá)到，就不會產(chǎn)生太好的激勵效果。與之相反的錯誤是行權(quán)條件要求過低，讓激勵對象不費吹灰之力就能輕松獲得股權(quán)。他們的注意力將從努力工作轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榕μ赚F(xiàn)，只想著增加個人收益，損害公司和其他股東的利益。
The effectiveness of equity incentives is directly influenced by the exercise conditions. If the requirements for exercise of rights are too high, and the incentive object has had a lot of effort to barely achieve it, it will not have a very good incentive effect. The opposite mistake is that the exercise conditions are too low, allowing incentive recipients to easily obtain equity without any effort. Their attention will shift from working hard to working hard to cashing out, with a focus on increasing personal income and harming the interests of the company and other shareholders.
風(fēng)險四：增加財務(wù)成本
Risk 4: Increasing financial costs
實施股權(quán)激勵計劃時必須充分考慮公司當(dāng)前的資金狀況。假如短期內(nèi)的激勵幅度太大，公司的資金周轉(zhuǎn)就會變得緊張，財務(wù)收益減少，甚至因業(yè)績下滑而虧損。這對急需融資的企業(yè)來說是很不利的。為此，我們在制定股權(quán)激勵計劃的時候，要仔細(xì)考慮激勵成本對公司利潤的影響，減少不必要的財務(wù)成本。
When implementing equity incentive plans, it is necessary to fully consider the current financial situation of the company. If the short-term incentive is too large, the company's capital turnover will become tight, financial returns will decrease, and even suffer losses due to performance decline. This is very unfavorable for enterprises that urgently need financing. Therefore, when formulating equity incentive plans, we should carefully consider the impact of incentive costs on the company's profits and reduce unnecessary financial costs.
風(fēng)險五：影響上市和融資成功率
Risk 5: Impact on the success rate of listing and financing
對于正在準(zhǔn)備上市的公司而言，股權(quán)變更往往會被特別關(guān)注。因為有些公司假借股權(quán)激勵的名義在暗地里進行利益輸送。還有的公司選擇的激勵對象經(jīng)不起審計，不符合公司的利益。
For companies preparing to go public, equity changes often receive special attention. Because some companies use the name of equity incentives to secretly transmit profits. Some companies choose incentive targets that cannot withstand auditing and are not in line with the company's interests.
這些情況都會影響公司上市的成功率和融資成功率。所以，我們在制定和實施股權(quán)激勵計劃時，必須聘請的法律顧問把關(guān)，確保每個股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)文件合理合法，避免一切不規(guī)范的做法。這樣才能確保公司上市成功，融資順利，健康發(fā)展。
These situations will all affect the success rate of a company's listing and financing success rate. Therefore, when formulating and implementing equity incentive plans, we must hire professional legal advisors to ensure that each equity incentive related document is reasonable and legal, and avoid all non-standard practices. Only in this way can we ensure the success of the company's listing, smooth financing, and healthy development.
The above is an introduction to Jinan Equity Design. Thank you for taking the time to review our company's information and content http://www.kratomcapsulesgnc.com If you want to learn more, please feel free to call for consultation
咨詢電話：
